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1. Introduction

One of the basic properties of the household production model applied
by economists to the determination of fertility is that the quantity of
children a family has is the outcome of

one of a large

set

of

family decisions influenced by a common set of relative shadow prices
corresponding to different activities ([ 2 ], [ 11], and [29 ]).

In this

study an economic framework derived from the general household model is
applied to household behavior in rural-agricultural areas of less-developed
countries (LDCb)
insignificant.

-- family

where

the pecuniary contributions of children may not be

Decisions which are jointly associated with child investment

size, schooling, and child labor-force participation--are examined

simultaneously in an econometric analysis utilizing district-level data
from the 1961 Census of India to obtain a multi-dimensional test of the
applicability of the household economic framework to developing countries
and to identify possible policy instruments which might alter the demand for
children and child schooling.

It is also shown that the joint estimation

approach utilized,by taking advantage of the symmetry

properties of the

household model, provides potentially more information on the relative
magnitudes of price and income elasticities
family income are not available

when data on potential full

than the. more common technique of esti

mating one behavioral relationship, such as fertility(as in [ 5 ], [27 ],
[28]).

The empirical results obtained support the usefullness of the household
model in the LDC context and suggest the importance of price effects associated
with the economic-contribution of children as well as
the mother in the allocation of family
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resources to children and child schooling .

Variables

positivel y correlate d

with the pecuniary returns to child labor--si ze of landholdi ngs, agri
cultural productiv ity, and child wage rates--ap pear to be positivel y re
lated to fertility and child labor-for ce participa tion and negativel y
correlate d with child schooling .

The wage rates of adult women, however,

have a negative effect on family size and a positive influence on the school
enrollmen t rates of children.
2. Economic Framework
A large number of household models can be carved out of the gen~ral
household productio n framework (see[ 5 ], [ 7 ], [15 ], and [28 ]) by both
restrictin g the set of commoditi es Z providing utility to the parental
decision-m akers and/or by imposing restrictio ns on the characte ristics of
the household productio n relations .

To focus on the multiple activitie s of

children in LDCs we assume that parents maximize a utility function, 1(1)
composed of four commodit ies,

U(Z.)

(1)

J

j = N, E, L, S

the quantity of children N, the schooling E and leisure L per child, and a
composite commodity represent ing the standard of living of the household , S.
The productio n of the four commoditi es

cU"e described

by linear homogenous

productio n functions , given by (2), but of the time inputs only that of the
wife T.

JW

(2)

is used to produce N and Sand only child time T.

JC

Z. = y.(X.,T •• )
J
J J Jl.

i = w for j = N,S

=c

for j

= E,L

is assumed to
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contribute significantly to the p1•oduction of E and L.

2

Aggregated bundles

of goods X., purchased in the market at price P. are used in the production
J

J

Children also work T

of each commodity j.
w

C

WC

units of time at a wage rate

and the husband and wife spend TM (full time) and T
W

WW

in employment and earn wage rates WH and Ww respectively.

units of time
Child schooling,

in the traditional rural environoment of an LDC for which the model is
formulated, is assumed to yield negligible p~cuniary returns~
Noting that expenditures on goods must equal total income, including
non-earnings income V, and that the time allocated by the wife and children
to household production and market work cannot exceed their full time n

w

and n N, the full income (F) constraint can be written as (3), where
C

X.,
J

t .• are the marginal
J J.

(3)

+ NL'PLXL = tL CC
W) + S(p S XS + t SW W)
W
(=

average) input coefficients of goods and time used in the household pro

cution of commodity j.
Maximization of (1) subject to (3) yields a set of commodity shadow
prices nj corresponding to the commodity set:
+

EpEXE + LpLXL, nE

= N(pEXE

+ tEcWc), nL

nN = PNXN + tNwww - Twcwc

= N(pEXL

+ tLcWc)'ns="s + tswWw.

The shadow price of children is thus a positive function of the price of the
goods used to produce children, the wage of the wife and the levels of
4
child schooling and leisure chosen but is negatively related to total
earnings per child.

The shadow prices of child schooling and leisure,

however, are positively correlated with the number of children and the
opportunity cost of school attendance and child leisure, the child wage rate.
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The compensated substitution elasticities of the three child invest
ment commodities with respect to the child wage

n~w,
J

differentiating the first order conditions, noting

derived by totally

C

that the symmetry

of the bordered Hesian implies that the sum of own and cross compensated
substitution elasticities must equal zero, can be written as (4):

(4)

= 11~
, J1f (-8 N) +
N

n*w
J C

... e
nj'1r E E +

e

n~~

J1TL L

wpere

e.
J

T w

T. w

JC C

= 1T •

WC C

j = E,L and 0N =

1TN

J

Second-order conditions restrict

n*

]11'.

<

O, all j, so that the sign of

J

(4) depends on the complementarit y-subsitution relationships between N,E,
and L.

If both E and Lare substitutes for N but are themselves complements,

then n*

N,rt,

,

nE1r

E

<

O, and (4) is unambiguously positive for j = N and negative

for j = E, L.
The observed market child wage rate may not always reflect the n,ue marginal value product of children if there are market imperfections, however,
as may be likely in LDCs.

In the absence of a well-functionin g child labor

market, it would be expected that the economic contribution of children at
the margin

Wwould

be influenced by a veccor of agricultural production in5

A

puts A, such that W. = ( (A) , ('
C

>

0 and thus the sign of the compensated A -

elasticity of the jth commodity n*jA would be identical to that observed

for n* ;
]WC
(5)
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where

W

T.

e. =

JC

J

= E,L

j

C

T

and eN

J

WC

C

1T

1T.

Thus,

W
= ---.

under the sufficient

Nbut not necessary conditions

relating to the assumed signs of the cross-compensated
substitution relations, a compensated rise in the child wage rate or factors
positively associated with the marginal pecuniary contribution of children
would increase the demand for numbers of children and decrease both the
schooling and leisure of each child, the strength of the effects depending
on the child earnings intensity of each commodity.

or nf < o,
1
C
O, since it least one ej must exceed 0.

the symmetry of the model, the finding that n~w
or nNL

imply llNW

>

Moreover, because of
would necessarily

C

Mutatis mutandis, the compensated substitution elasticities with respect
to the wife's wage rate, given by (6), is negative for j = N and positive
for j = E,L
(6)

n-*w
J w

where
t. w
a. =
J

JW W

1T.

j = N,S

J

if the shadow price of children is more earnings intensive in the wife's
time thanis the shadow price of S.

Compensated increases in the wife's

wage would thus lead to a substitution of child schooling, leisure ands
for numbers of children.
If full income cannot be held constant, the uncompensated substitution
elasticities become relevant.
pression (fl),

The uncompensated wage elasticity formula, ex
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(7)

n].W.

].

=

i = c,w

n]~W. + ~.E.

].

l.J

where e. is the pure income elasticity for the jth commodity and $c =
J

w NT
C

CW

/F, $

W

=WT

WW 1

/F,indicates that of the uncompensated child wage
is unambiguous (>O) since an

rate elasticities, only the sign of nNw
C

increase in the child wage would both reduce the relative price of child
quantity and increase income (inferiority ruled
would be positive.

out). 6Similarly, n

NA

While the signs of the uncompensated child schooling

and leisure elasticities with respect to the child wage and A are not
similarly restricted, (7) suggests that the greater the share of child
earnings in the shadow prices (a.) and the smaller the contribution of each
J

child to full family income($ c ) the more likely the compensated and un
Similarly, while

compensated child wage effects will be alike in sign.

and nLW must exceed zero, no restriction is placed on the sign of
w
the uncompensated elasticity of N with respect to the wife's wage, but the

nEN

w

compensated substitution effect is more likely to dominate the

income

effect on 1

demand for children the higher the time value intensity differential between nN and ns, the greater as, and the lower the wife's contribution to
full family income.
Expressions (4), (5) ,

(6), and (7) thus give the partial elasticities

of child quantity, schooling per child and leisure per child with respect to the
wage and child-earnings-augmenting parameters in the set of reduced-form household
demand equations derived from the model, given by (8).

7
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(8)

Z. = oo.(W ,W ,WH,A,P.)
]

]

C

W

]

3. Data and Estimation Techniques
The simple economic framework described above, because it yields
few unambiguous predictions regarding uncompensated price effects in any
one household demand equation, even under a large number of restrictive
assumptions, suggests that estimating only the fertility relationship
when information on the total potential income of the family is not available,
(as is likely in rural-agricultural areas of LDCs) would provide little
evidence on the importance of the economic contribution of children in the
commodity shadow price structure faced by LDC households.

In the absence

of such income data, positive coefficents for agricultural input variables,
such as landholdings, in the fertility regression equation would be obtained
even if the child earnings components in the shadow prices were negligible
(8.=0) since such variables would be positively associated with family inJ

come.

However, the finding that the estimated coefficients of these variables

displayed negative signs in a child schooling equation, a result possible
only if substitution effects

dominated income effects, would imply that

8j>O and, given (5) and (7),would suggest that the relevant positive parameter
estimates in the fertility regression also represent a substitution effect.
To assess the importance of the economic contribution of children in
child investment decisions we thus exploit the symmetrical properties of the
model by simultaneously estimating five regression equations explaining
the cross-sectional variation in fertility, sex-specific child school en
rollment and child labor-force participation rates in the rural population
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of India in 1961, utiliz ing distri ct-lev el data from 13 states 8
.

The five

struct ural estima ting equati ons (9) corres pondin g to (8) but assume
d to
be embedded in a simult aneou s equati ons system , contai n
se'tso f endoge nous and exogen ous variab les, 9

(9)

Y.1 = 8XX. +
1

s.z.1
N

+ u.1

(i = 1 ...

identi cal

n)

where Y. are Sxl vector s of depend ent variab les, X. are 2x5 vector
s of
1
1
endoge nous variab les, Z. are lOxl vector s of exogen ous variab
les, 8
1

X

and

Sx2 and SxlO matric es of coeffi cients to be estima ted, and U.
are
1
Sxl vector s

of random distur bance s.

The variab les used are define d and their

sample means and standa rd deviat ions listed in Table l; data
source s are
given in the Appen dix.
Child wage rates and land produ ctivity are the variab les assume
d to be
endoge nous, functi ons as well as determ inants of the fertil ity
behav ior of
famili es and the labor force and school ing behav ior of childr
en at the
aggreg ate lsv€l.

To obtain consis tent param eter estima tes the equati ons are

thus estima ted using two-st age least square s (TSLS ).10 The exogen
ous
variab les exclud ed from (9) used to identi fy the system are also
listed in
Table 1.

The matrix of coeffi cient signs of the empir ical count erpart s to
the
exogen ous variab les of the model forthco ming under condi tions
in which sub
stitut ion domin ate income effect s (notin g that child labor- force
partic ipa
tion is the complement of child time in school and at leisur e
)is given in
Table 2.

These signs are not "predi ctions " of the model , with the except
ions

Table 1

VARIABLE DICTIONARY AND SAMPLE MEANS
RURAL DISTRICTS OF INDIA 1961
S.D.

Definintion

Mean

CWR

Children 5-9 per women 15-44 (x 100), ageadjusteda

358.4

ENRF

Per cent female children enrolled in school
5-14

29.8

25.1

F.NRM

Per cent male children enrolled in school 5-14

68.6

23.2

CLABF

Per cent female children engaged in cultivation, 21.3
herding, or as hired labor

12.8

CLABM

Per cent male children engaged in cultivation,
herding, or as hired labor

26.4

12.0

38.5

22.9

Variahles

Dependent:
39.4

Endogenous:
b

PROD

Rupees per net acre sown

WAGEC

Daily field wages wages of children, in
rupees (cash & kind)

0.82

0.29

WAGEM

Daily field wages of adult males, in
rupees (cash & kind)

1.51

0.40

WAGEF

Daily field wages of adult females, in
rupees (cash & kind)

1.08

0.34

LAND

Average land holdings per household, in acres

12.6

KUS

Kuznets index of landholdings inequality•c

8?.. 3

PRMM

Per cent males 15-44 who completed primary
school

12.1

F.xogenous,
included

PRMF

.Per cent females 15-44 who completed primary
school

9.81
15.9
9.10

3.49

4.29

MATM

Per cent males 15-44 who matriculated

?..60

2.55

MATF

Per cent females 15-44 who matriculated

0.35

0.86

RUR

Proportion of population classified as rural

0.82

0.12

Exogenous,
exeluded:
Average annual rainfall 1956-60
in centimeters

Per cent of cultivated acres irrigated
Number of factories and workshops in district
Per cent of factories and workshops employing
5 + oersons
Per cent of factories and workshops powered

335.6

610.7

13.7
7743

17.9
7675

8.82
18.6

3.55
18.5

Notes to Table 1

aChild-woman ratio divided by E P.. B., where i = age-group of women,
i

1]. 1

(i = 15 ••• 44), P.. = proportion of women aged 15-44 of age i. in district
1]

j, B. =birthrate of women aged i in India.
1

r

P.

bAgricultural productivity in district j = i

1.

c..

1]

, where C. • = total
1]

E L••

production of crop i in district j,

i

1]

P. = national price of crop i, L•• = net acres sown for crop i in district j.
1

1]

cKuznets index for district j =

r 1µj1 ij
•
1

--

-

e1]
.. \

where t. . = mean acres of land owned for population group i in district j
1]

(i = 1 •.. 8), µ.=mean acres owned per household in district j, e. =
J

1

ratio of population in group i to total population in district j.

I

J

Table 2
Expected Coefficient Signsa

CWR

ENRF

ENRM

CLABF

CLABM

LAND

+

+

+

PROD

+

+

+

WAGEC

+

+

+

'fAGEF

+

+

aCompensated substitution effects are assumed to dominate income effects.
Otherwise all but the coefficient signs of LAND, PROD and WAGEC in the
in the CLABF and CLABM equations
WAGEF
CWR equation of
are unknown a priori.
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of those for the coefficients of LAND, PROD, and WAGEC in the CWR equation
and of WAGEF in the child labor-force equations, and are presented as
a benchmark case.

If obtained empricially, this sign configuration would con

stitute the strongest evidence, within the dimensions of the test, of the

existenc◄

of substitution effects caused by variations in the economic contribution of childl
and the earnings of women in the family size, schooling, and child employment decisions of rural Indian families.
The expected effects of the additional variables included in the set
of regressors are as follows: 11
(i) The male wage coefficients, given the specialization assumed in the model,
would be expected to embody pure income effects and thus should display posi
tive signs in the family size and schooling equations and negative signs in
the child employment regressions.
(ii) The summary measure of the distribution of landholdings, the Kuznets
ratio, is used to test for possible non-linearities in the effects of land
holdings on the decision variables.

Among small landholders the returns

from (unpaid) family labor may be negligible and thus increases or- decreases

in land size might not have a significant impact on fertility or school
enrollment.
returns to

Similarly, for parents owning very large land holdings, the
schooling children might be higher and the economic contri-

bution of children less important since schooling might improve the child's
ability to eventually manage and operate a large enterprise.

Thus, the

higher the ratio of inequality, i.e., the greater the number of small land
holders and the larger the holdings of the large landowners, the lower would
be aggregate fertility and the higher school enrollment in the district.
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(iii) The effects of the male and female parental schooling attainment

variables on the dependent variables are difficult to predict, given the
portmanteau

nature

of education, particularly when the 'market'

productivity effects of schooling are at least partially impounded in the
parental wage rate coefficients.

Loebner and Driver [15] have shown

schooling in India to be positively associated with knowledge of contra
ception techniques, suggesting that some of these variables may display
negative coefficients in the fertility equation.

Two levels of schooling

variables are employed to capture potential non-linear schoolings effects,
as found

by Ben-Porath [ 5 Jin Israel.

(iv) The proportion of the total district population defined as 'rural' is
included in the set of independent variables to assess the effects of proximity
to urban areas on rural child investment behavior.

Since all the other data

used in this study pertain to the rural population, the coefficient of this
variable should not therefore be interpreted as an indicator of rural-urban
behavior differentials.

The rurality of a district may negatively influence

rural school enrollment to the extent that the returns to schooling are
higher in non-agricultural jobs and the probability of obtaining non-agri
cultural employment is positively correlated with proximity to urban areas;
similarly, the more rural the district the more likely children are to be
employed in agriculture.
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4. The Results

The TSLS coefficient estimates for the five structural equations are
reported in Table 3.

Elasticities, computed at the sample means for the

most significant variables are displayed in Table 4.

The results as a

whole suggest the general importance of price effects in the allocation
of resources among child-related activities in rural India, as indicated
by the conformity of the sub-set of coefficient signs corresponding to the
wage and agricultural input variables to the matrix of expected signs of
Table 2.

Conclusions derived from the individual equations are as follows:

(i) Family size.

The parameter estimates of the family size equation appear

to support the hypothesis that where variables positively associated with
the economic contribution of children have high values, family size is also
high--a 10 percent increase in the child wage rate appears to be associated
with a 6 percent rise in the age-adjusted child-woman ratio ~

2

Land size,

assumed to be complementary with child labor, also has a positive and sig
nificant effect on the child-woman ratio and its relation to the fertility
mea::.ure appec:ll'::; to be non-linear, as expected.

The sign of the Kuznets

ratio coefficient thus suggests that reducing the inequality of landholdings
would increase family size in India.

The coefficient of the land productivity

variable is insignificant, however.
The results also suggest that a rise in the wage rates of adult women
by ten percent would decrease the child-woman ratio by almost 8 percent,
indicating the dominance of the substitution over the income effect, as
found by Mincer [17] for the U.S. and Wilkinson [27] for Sweden.

A similar

increase in the wage rates received by males, however, because of their

Table 3
TSLS Regression Coefficient s
Indian Districts 1961
(t-values in parentheses )

CWR

ENRF

ENRM

CLABF

CLABM

LAND

1.94
(4.21)

-0.89
(6.85)

-1.15
(6.62)

0.37
(2.99)

0.18
(1.72)

KUS

-0.60
(2.43)

0.24
(3.41)

0.40
(4.31)

-0.05
(lo93)

-0.08
(1.48)

PRODa

0.16
(0.58)

-0.24
(3.03)

-0.35
(3.30)

0.10
(2.73)

0.10
(1.60)

WAGECa

257.1
(2.91)

-73.5
(2.96)

-13.3
(0.40)

1.38
(0.05)

7.95
(0.41)

WAGEF

-253.0
(2.75)

77.7
(3.00)

23.58
(0.69)

-27. 9
(1.84)

-16.66
(0.82)

WAGEM

71.2
(2.43)

-17.6
(2.13)

-6.17
(0.56)

-16.5
(2.13)

-4.97
(0.76)

PRMM

-0.30
(0.40)

0.1s
(o. 85)

o.64
(2.32)

-0.19
(0.97)

-0.80
(4.87)

MATM

1.30
(0.88)

0.69
(1.68)

1.09
(1. 97)

-0.52
(1.33)

-0.01
(0.03)

PRMF

2.17
(1.12)

0.67
(1.23)

o.39
(0.54)

-0.41
(0.80)

-0.64
(1.50)

MATF

-20.2
(1.85)

21.7
(7.08)

12.77
(3 .13)

-7.21
(2.50)

-9.62
(3.98)

RUR

-8.65
(0.27)

-9.79
(1.06)

-29.4
(2.41)

17 .13
(1.99)

(1.33)

28.5

68.5

8.64

27.8

65.5

25.5

9.03

17 .04

.44

.58

Dependent
Variable

C

F(l2 ,176)
2b
R

348.0
3.52
.23

.85

.69

9a62

~ndogenous variables.
2
bR is the multiple correlation coefficientc orrec1Bd.fo r degrees of freedom obtained
£'Dom the correspondi ng reduced-form equation.

Table 4
Mean Uncompensated Elasticities - Child Activities in Rural India

Independent
Variables

CWR

DeEendent Variables
ENRM
CLABF
ENRF

LAND

.07

-.38

-.21

.22

-.14

.66

.48

-.19

PROD

-a

-.31

-.20

.18

WAGEC

.59

-2.02

*b

WAGEF

-.76

2.82

*

WAGEM

.30

-.89

*

-1.17

-.02

.25

.07

-.12

KUS

MATF

8

CLABM
.09

*
-1.41

*
*
-.13

Denotes coefficient statistically insignificant

bCoefficient estimate rendered insignificant by multicollinearity; variable
is part of set having joint statistical significance.
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presumed insignific ant role in household productio n, would increase family
size by three percent, a result which suggests that the income elasticit y
of demand for children is of moderate size but that family size is non
inferior.

Male education appears to have little relation to family size,

but the proportio n.of women with schooling levels above the primary grades
is negativel y and significa ntly associate d with the birth rate measure. 13
No evidence is obtained that the degree of urbanizat ion significa ntly in
fluences the size of rural families.
(ii) Sex-spec ific school enrollmen t. To test for significa nt differenc es in
the overall structure of the male and female enrollmen t equations , statis
tical tests ([ 6] and [ 12]) were performed , treating the two equations
as if they were estimated from two separate samples.

These revealed the

set of coefficie nts in each (while alike in signs) to be significa ntly
different at the 5 percent level. The variables assumed to be positivel y
associate d with the marginal value product of children in agricultu re-land size, productiv ity and the child wage--dis play negative coefficie nts
in both the male and female equations , however, and all are statistic ally
significa nt except for that of the child wage in the male equation.

In

that equation, however, the three wage variables are highly collinear -the set of wage rates are jointly significa nt (F-test, 5 percent level).
The coefficie nt of the Kuznets ratio is also statistic ally significa nt in
both equations and displays a positive sign, opposite to that in the family
size equation, suggestin g that a more equal distribut ion of land is associate d
with lower school enrollmen t rates.

These results, in conjuncti on with the

family size equation paramet~r estimates , thus suggest the existence of a

-13-

shado~~~e structure in India favorable to large families and inducing low
rates of child investment through formal schooling--the shadow wage of
children appears to be a strong deterrent to schooling and at least a
significant offset

to the cost of large families.

The coefficient of the female wage rate is positive in both enroll
ment equations as predicted by the model; where women earn wage rates ten
percent above the mean, the school enrollment rates of girls are higher
by almost thirty percent.

Thi~ relationship would appear to be due to

both a substitution and an income effect, since the existence of a strong
substitution away from (time-intensive) children as a consequence of a fe
male wage rise is indicated in the family size equation.

The significant

positive coefficien1Sfor the high-level female schooling variable in the
two enrollment equations, combined with the family size results,
suggest that,more highly educated as well as

better-paid women in rural

India tend to invest more intensively and less extensively in children.
Higher schooling levels of adult males, at both the primary and higher
levels,appear to be significantly associated only with higher levels of

male school enrollment; the negative signs of the male wage coefficient in
both equations are a puzzle, however.

Lack of proximity to urban areas

significantly reduces the enrollment rates of rural males, but· not of fe
males.
(iii) Sex-specific child labor-force participation.
two sex-specific child labor-force equations

The structures of the

differ significantly (5

percent level), with the males equation again plagued by multicollinearity-
the joint effect of the wage, land and productivity variables is statistically

significant in that equation at the 5 percent level.

All the coefficient s

of these variables, however, display signs in accordance with expectation s
and replicate those in the family size equation--th ose variables positively
correlated with the returns to child labor have positive effects on child
labor-force participati on, while the femaie wage rate has a negative in
fluence on the employment of children.

The individual coefficient s of

land size, distributio n, productivit y and the female wage in the females
equation are statistical ly significant .
In both equations, only the upper-level adult female schooling variable
has a significant negative effect on child labor-force participatio n, con
sistent with the non-linear female schooling relationshi ps obtained in the
enrollment and family size equations.

Of the male education coefficient s,

only that of the primary schooling variable is significant in the males
equation.

The degree of urbanizatio n in the district appears to be nega

tively related to the proportion of rural children engaged in agricultura l
employment, but is significant only in the females equation.
5.

Conclusions
The results obtained indicate that a multi-equat ion econometric model

derived from the household production framework which focusses on the economic
contributio n of children and the wife can, by inference, aid in understandi ng
the shadow price configurati on jointly influencing family decisions concerning
fertility and the school enrollment and labor-force participatio n of children in
rural India.

The findings support the hypothesis that one

of the basic conditions motivating Indian families to bear relatively large
numbers of children in the late 1950's was the high return to the use of
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raw labor power of children compared to investments in skills obtained in
schools 14 , but suggest two areas of possible policy intervention with
regard to reducing the demand for children--the encouragement of female
employment and schooling.

Discouraging the use of child labor in agri

culture would appear to reduce birth rates and increase school enrollment
but such a policy is questionable from a welfare perspective.

The results

also suggest that a land redistribution program aimed at promoting equality,
unaccompanied by other changes, would both increase fertility and depress
school enrollment rates.
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Third World Congress of the Econometric Society. Research
was supported by a grant from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations'
Program in Support of Social Science and Legal Research on Popu
lation t'olicy. We are grateful to Simon Kuznets, T. Paul Schultz,
and Barbara Anderson for helpful comments. Research and pro
gramming assistance was provided by James Devine, Anne 11organ,
and RobertaRobson.

Footnotes

1 see Becker [ 3 J for a discussion of the
assumptions underlying
~amily utility maximization.
2 •Quality' per child
as influenced by the mother is assumed to be
fixed, as in [ 5 ], but the satisfaction provided by each child can be
augmented by increasing child time in school or in leisure activities.
3
see T.W. Schultz [24] for a discussion of the role of schooling in
traditional agriculture.
4

The dependence of the shadow price of the quantity of children on

the levels of child leisure and schooling, and vice versa, creates a
discrepency between "true" and observed pure income elasticities, as dis
cussed in [ 4 ].
5
The shadow price of N is thus no longer invariant with respect to
the quantity of children.

For a more detailed discussion of the relation

ship between agricultural production inputs and the shadow price of children,
see Rosenzweig [23 J~

The price of time of the wife is assumed to be un

influenced by these variables.
6
since
given the
7

lj ,.E.
JJ

= 1, where $.=~.Z./F, it is unlikely that any
J

JJ

E.
J

<

o,

level of aggregation of the model.

(8) does not, of course, represent the complete set of household

demand relations; which would also include equations for the demand for S
and derived demand equations for the labor force participation of the wife
and the set of X.'s.
J

they are ignored here.

As these equations are not estimated in this study,
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8The results obtained are thus not merely representative of a small
and perhaps atypical geographical area of India, as in most other studies
of Indian fertility and related behavior, including [15], [18], [22],[25],
and [26].

Data fyom 232 districts were compiled, but because of missing

variables only 189 are used in the regressions reported.
9

Thus no gains in efficiency would be achieved by employing methods

relevant to the estimation of seemingly unrelated regression equations,
as described in [29].
10Tests for heteroscedastic residuals,
described in [23], revealed no

significant relationships between residual variahces and district popula
tion size.

Regressions are thus unweighted.

11A variable representing the proportion
of Moslem to total women

aged 15-19 was also entered in all regression equations to test for differences
in child investment behavior associated with religious affiliation, as
found by Rele [22] and others in prior studies of Indian data.

The coefficients

of this variable, however, did not attain significance in any equation.
12

The inter-district variation in the child-woman ratio reflects both

cross-sectional differences in birth and child mortality rates since the
numerator of the variable is the stock of surviving children.

This measure

of "fertility" is appropriate within the framework of the household model,
formulated in terms of family size, but the empirical results (and the model)
therefore do not indicate how the optimal stock of children is achieved.
That child mortality as well as fertility is a volitional variable is
suggested by the differential sex-specific child mortality rates in India.
(see [l]).
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13 An auxi• 1 iary
-+-.
• wh.ich th e propo~,Lion
of
•
·
not repor t e d , in
regression,
married to total women aged 15-19 was regressed on the set of independent
variables utilized in the five equations discussed in the text, indicated
that the proportion of early marriages in a district was not significant ly
influenced by the proportion of women who had received schooling above the
primary level.

This suggests that the higher-leve l female schooling

variable is not acting merely as a proxy for age at marriage in the family
size equation.
14

However, rapid changes in agricultura l technology, such as occurred

during the 'green revolution' period in India, may have increased the returns
to schooling by

disrupting the equilibrium conditions existing prior to

that time and to which the data used her pertain.

-19Appendix:

Data Sources

CWR, Table C-III, [20], rural age-spe cific birth rates from [21];
ENRF,M, Table B-IX, [19]; CLABF,M,

Table B-I, [19]; PROD, (23) Crop

prices from Table 1, 2 [9], crop producti on and acres from various volumes ,
[11] and [14]; WAGEC,F,M,
MATM,F,

[8]; LAND, KUS, Table C-I, [20]; PRMM,F,

Table C-III, [10]; RUR, Table C-III, [20]; rainfal l, [18]; acres

irrigate d, Vol. II, [10].
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